The act of reaching for and acting upon an object involves two forms of selection: selection of the object as a target, and selection of the action to be performed. While these two forms of selection are logically dissociable, and are evidently subserved by separable neural pathways, they must also be closely coordinated. We examine the nature of this coordination by developing and analyzing a computational model of object and action selection first proposed by Ward [Ward, R. (1999). Interactions between perception and action systems: a model for selective action. In G. W. Humphreys, J. Duncan, & A. Treisman (Eds.), Attention, Space and Action: Studies in Cognitive Neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press]. An interesting tenet of this account, which we explore in detail, is that the interplay between object and action selection depends critically on top-down inputs representing the current task set or plan of action. A concrete manifestation of this, established through a series of simulations, is that the impact of distractor objects on reaching times can vary depending on the nature of the current action plan. In order to test the model's predictions in this regard, we conducted two experiments, one involving direct object manipulation, the other involving tool-use. In both experiments we observed the specific interaction between task set and distractor type predicted by the model. Our findings provide support for the computational model, and more broadly for an interactive account of object and action selection.
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Introduction
A fundamental aspect of object-directed action, pointed out by Allport (1987) , is that it depends on "two essential forms of selection: Which action? and Which object to act upon?" (p. 395). These two forms of selection are logically and experimentally dissociable, and of course there exists an abundance of research focusing on either one or the other in isolation. The two forms of selection have also been proposed to depend, to some extent, on separable neural pathways (Borowsky et al., 2005; Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Milner & Goodale, 1995; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982) . However, in addition to recognizing this separability, it is also necessary to understand how object and action selection are coordinated during goal-directed behavior. As pointed out again by Allport (1987) , such "integration or coordination is manifestly essential for the coherence of action" (p. 396).
A growing body of research indicates that action-and objectselection processes are indeed far from independent (Prinz & Hommel, 2002) . First, the process of object selection can influence action selection. For example, Tucker and Ellis (1998) found that attending to photographs of familiar objects having handles (e.g., frying pans) facilitated button-presses on the same side of space as the handle (see also Tipper, Paul, & Hayes, 2006) . Similar facilitatory effects of object viewing on grip selection have also been reported (Ellis & Tucker, 2000) . Castiello (1996) found that, under certain circumstances, the shape of distractor objects influenced hand shape in reaching-to-grasp. Finally, a previous study of our own found that distractor objects strongly affording potential grasping actions (e.g., distractors with handles facing toward the acting hand) slowed responses to targets more than distractors with weaker affordances for grasping (Pavese & Buxbaum, 2002) .
At the same time, other work has argued for an influence of action selection on object selection. Specifically, it has been proposed that during visual search, the intention to perform a specific action can affect the saliency of objects affording that action. Work by Craighero and colleagues (Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 2002; Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti, & Umilta, 1998;  
